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Executive Summary 
 
Researchers have offered several explanations for the decline in unionization. Many emphasize that 
“globalization” and the technological advances embodied in the “new economy” have made unions 
obsolete. 
 
If the decline in unionization is the inevitable response to the twin forces of globalization and 
technology, then we would expect unionization rates to follow a similar path in countries subjected 
to roughly similar levels of globalization and technology. 
 
Instead, for 21 rich economies, including the United States, what we see over the last five decades is 
a wide range of trends in union membership and collective bargaining.  
 
Union coverage (the share of workers whose terms of employment were covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement) changed little and even rose slightly in a substantial number of countries, 
including the years since 1980.  
 
Union membership (the share of workers who are members of a union) fell in most of the rich 
economies, but losses varied substantially from country to country. The United States experienced 
membership losses near the middle of the distribution, but started from a 1980 membership rate 
that was low by the standard of other rich countries. 
 
These differences across countries exposed to broadly similar levels of globalization and 
technological change suggest that these factors do not mechanically determine national levels of 
unionization. 
 
The broad national political environment, however, does appear to explain much of the observed 
variation in unionization trends. 
 
Countries strongly identified during the postwar period with social democratic parties – Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, and Finland – have generally seen small increases in union coverage and only 
small decreases in union membership since 1980. 
 
Over the same period, countries typically described as “liberal market economies” – the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Canada, and Japan – have generally 
seen sharp drops in union coverage and membership.  
 
Countries in the broad Christian democratic tradition, sometimes referred to as “coordinated market 
economies” or  “continental market economies” – Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, and Switzerland – typically have had outcomes somewhere in between the social 
democratic and liberal market economies, with small drops in union coverage and moderate declines 
in union membership.  
 
These patterns are consistent with the view that national politics are a more important determinant 
of recent trends in unionization than globalization or technological change. 
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Introduction 
 
The unionized share of the US workforce has been declining from the early 1960s through the 
present. The pace of that decline was slow at first, but accelerated at the end of the 1970s, leaving 
only about 12 percent of all workers and 7 percent of private sector workers in unions by 2010 (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Union Membership in the United States, 1948-2010 
 
  
 
Source: Labor Research Association analysis updated using Bureau of Labor Statistics “Union Members” reports, 
2003-10. 
 
 
Researchers have offered many explanations for the decline in unionization.1 Some suggest that the 
demand for union representation has fallen. Most, however, argue that, for various reasons, the 
supply of union jobs has decreased. Some researchers blame the leadership of the union movement 
for focusing too much on a “business” model that emphasizes servicing existing members rather 
than organizing new members. Others emphasize weak legal protections for the right to organize, in 
combination with heightened employer opposition beginning in the early 1980s.2 But, probably the 
most common argument, at least in the public discussion, is the idea that unions are incompatible 
with the emerging, increasingly globalized, high-tech, service economy. 
 
If the decline in unionization is the inevitable response to the twin forces of globalization and 
technology, then we would expect unionization rates to follow a similar path in other countries 
subjected to roughly similar levels of globalization and technology. 
 
                                                 
1 For relatively recent discussions of the possible causes of union decline in the United States and internationally, see 
Baldwin (2003), Blanchflower (2006), Farber (2005), Flanagan (2007), Pencavel (2005), Wallerstein and Western (2000). 
2 For relatively recent discussions employer oppositions and legal barriers to unionization, see: Bronfenbrenner (2009), 
Freeman (2005), Logan (2006), Schmitt and Zipperer (2009). 
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In this report, we review unionization data for the last five decades for 21 rich economies. We find 
that trends in unionization have varied substantially across these economies. Union coverage (the 
share of workers whose terms of employment were covered by a collective bargaining agreement) 
changed little and even rose slightly in a substantial number of countries, including the period since 
1980. Union membership (the share of workers who are members of a union) fell in most of the rich 
economies, with the United States experiencing losses (from a low initial level of unionization) near 
the middle of the distribution. These differences across countries exposed to broadly similar levels 
of globalization and technological change suggest that neither factor mechanically determines 
national levels of unionization. 
 
One simple factor, however, does appear to explain much of the observed variation in unionization 
trends: the broad national political environment.3 Countries that have been strongly identified during 
the postwar period with social democratic parties – Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland – have 
generally seen small increases in union coverage and only small decreases in union membership since 
1980. Over the same period, countries that are more typically identified as “liberal market 
economies” – the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Canada, and 
Japan – have generally seen sharp drops in union coverage and membership. Countries in the broad 
Christian democratic tradition, sometimes referred to as “coordinated market economies” or 
“continental market economies” – Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and 
Switzerland – typically have had outcomes somewhere in between, with small drops in union 
coverage and moderate declines in union membership. These patterns are consistent with the view 
that national politics are a more important determinant of recent trends in unionization than 
globalization or technological change.4 
 
 
The ICTWSS Data 
 
We use the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and 
Social Pacts database (ICTWSS) compiled by Jelle Visser at the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labor Studies (AIAS) at the University of Amsterdam.5 The database provides annual information 
for the years 1960 through 2010 for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries, European Union member states, and selected emerging economies including 
Brazil, China, and India. From the ICTWSS database, we collected annual union coverage and 
membership data for 21 rich countries, all of which: are members of the OECD; have roughly 
comparable standards of living; and have nearly complete unionization data for the entire period 
from 1960 through the late 2000s. For reasons of economic comparability (as well as incomplete 
data availability), we have not included the ICTWSS data from developing or eastern European 
countries; due to their small size, we have also excluded Iceland and Luxembourg. 
 
We focus on two ICTWSS variables: bargaining coverage (union coverage) and the union density 
rate (union membership). The ICTWSS database defines its adjusted “bargaining (or union) 
coverage” as the employees “covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and 
                                                 
3 We follow the political categories established by Huber and Stephens (2001a, 2001b), as modified in Navarro, Schmitt, 
and Astudillo (2004).  
4 We also examine three ex-dictatorships, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, where the pattern is not as clear cut. 
5 The complete database can be downloaded at http://www.uva-aias.net/208. This paper uses the May 2011 version of 
the database. 
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salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for the 
possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain (removing such 
groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total 
number of dependent workers” in wage and salary employment). The ICTWSS defines the union 
density rate as “net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment.”6 
 
Union coverage and union membership rates may, and frequently do, differ in the same country in 
the same year. In the liberal market economies, including the United States, workers who are 
covered by a union contract at their workplace generally may choose not to join the union that 
represents them. As a result, union membership rates in the United States and other liberal market 
economies are typically somewhat lower than union coverage rates. In many of the countries we 
refer to here as continental market economies, “[m]ulti-employer bargaining and public policies 
extend ... the negotiated contract to nonorganized firms guarantee[ing] very high coverage rates ... 
far in excess of union density rates.”7 By contrast, union membership and coverage rates are similar 
(and high) in the social democratic countries. The most important reason is the use, in three of these 
countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden), of the “Ghent system,” which gives unions a major role 
in the delivery of social benefits, including unemployment insurance benefits, therefore providing 
strong incentives for workers to join unions.8 
 
The distinction between membership and coverage rates is an important one. As Visser explains: 
“Whereas union density is closer to measuring potential union bargaining pressure ... bargaining 
coverage [is] closer to measuring the effectiveness of unions in providing and defending minimum 
standards of income and employment protection in labor markets.”9 
 
The data used here have three other characteristics relevant to our analysis. First, while the union 
membership data are generally available annually, the adjusted union coverage data are usually not 
reported annually, often only every five years. Second, postwar unionization data for the ex-
dictatorships – Greece, Portugal and Spain – are either unavailable or only sporadically recorded 
until the 1970s. During much of the period before the mid-1970s, unions in these countries were 
either illegal or under direct government control.10 We show all ICTWSS data available for the ex-
dictatorships, including data covering periods before democracy, but we limit our analysis of trends 
in these countries only to the period since 1980. Finally, the data for Germany refer to West 
Germany until unification, and unified Germany from then on. 
 
 
The Trends 
 
Figure 2 displays the ICTWSS data for both union coverage (solid bars) and union membership 
(marked with an X) in 2007, the most recent year for which complete coverage is available for 
                                                 
6 Visser (2011), p. 18.  
7 See Visser (2006), p. 47; his remarks quoted here refer to “most European countries.” 
8 For recent discussions of the Ghent system and challenges facing it, see Scruggs (2002), Bockerman and Uusilato 
(2005), and Van Rie, Marx, and Horemans (2011). 
9   Visser (2006), p. 39. 
10  Figure 3 below reproduces the data exactly as they appear in the ICTWSS data, showing somewhat erratic behavior 
before the early 1980s. For details on trade unions in Greece, Portugal and Spain in the first three decades after the 
end of the Second World War, see: Ioannou (1999), Robolis (2008), and Teixeira (2001). 
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coverage and membership across the full sample. Coverage rates in just under half the countries 
were 80 percent or higher. Almost two-thirds of the countries had coverage rates above 50 percent. 
At 13.3 percent, the United States had the lowest coverage rate, followed closely by Japan (16.1 
percent) and New Zealand (17.0 percent). 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Union Coverage and Union Membership, 21 Rich Countries, 2007 
  
*2008 data used 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
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For almost every country, membership rates were lower than coverage rates. In many countries, this 
gap between coverage and membership rates is large. In Austria, for example, about 99 percent of 
eligible workers were covered by a collective bargaining agreement, but only 30 percent were 
members of a union. In France, about 90 percent of workers were covered, but fewer than 10 
percent were union members. Other countries with large gaps between coverage and membership 
include Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Australia.  
 
In the United States, coverage rates were only slightly higher than membership rates. This small 
difference generally reflects decisions by some workers who are represented by unions at their place 
of work not to join the union that represents them.  
 
In two countries, Japan and New Zealand, membership rates are higher than coverage rates. This 
pattern appears to arise from a feature of ICTWSS adjusted coverage rate data that we use here. As 
mentioned in the review of the ICTWSS data in the preceding section, the adjusted coverage rate is 
calculated after excluding from the calculation workers who are not legally entitled to collective 
bargaining (for example, some public-sector workers in some countries). As a result the workforce 
used in the coverage calculation can, in some cases, be smaller than the workforce used in the 
membership calculation (which includes all wage and salary employees). 
 
Our main interest, however, is in trends in unionization rates over time. Figure 3 shows the 
coverage and membership rates for the 21 rich economies in our sample from 1960 (or the earliest 
year available) through the late 2000s (typically 2007 or 2008). The dashed line represents union 
coverage and the solid line, union membership.  
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FIGURE 3 
Union Coverage and Union Membership, 21 Rich Countries, 1960-2010 
 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
 
Trends in unionization rates differ substantially across the sample. Initially, we identify five distinct 
patterns over the five decades. First, in just over half the countries, union coverage rates were roughly 
constant or even rising (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
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Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). Second, in a smaller share of countries (7 of the 21), 
union membership rates remained roughly constant or rose slightly (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain after 1980). Third, in 10 of the 21 countries, union coverage was 
falling (Australia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom, 
and the United States). Fourth, in two thirds of the sample, union membership was falling, frequently 
sharply (Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States). Finally, while in most countries 
union coverage and membership trends tracked each other (both rising or both falling) or were not 
far out of sync, coverage and membership trends did diverge in five countries (Austria, France, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland). In all five cases, coverage rates were flat or rising, while 
membership rates dropped. 
 
This initial review of the data raises serious doubts about the inevitability of union decline. While 
union membership rates fell in two thirds of the sample, membership rates were flat or constant in 
the other third. While union coverage rates fell in just under half of the 21 countries, coverage rates 
were flat or rising in just over half.  
 
At least at face value, globalization and technological progress do not appear capable of explaining 
these observed differences, primarily because all of these economies have been subjected to similar 
sets of forces in both regards. Figure 4, for example, shows that exports and imports are a large 
share of all 21 economies, ranging from just under 30 percent of total GDP in the case of the United 
States to just over 160 percent in the case of Belgium.11 If anything, countries with a higher level of  
globalization (by this measure) appear to have a higher level of union coverage.12 
 
FIGURE 4 
Union Coverage and Trade as Share of GDP, 21 Rich Countries, 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of ICTWSS and World Bank data. 
                                                 
11 The trade measure is the sum of the absolute value of exports and imports, both expressed as a share of GDP. 
12 Rodrik (1997) argues that higher levels of social protection, typically associated with higher levels of union coverage, 
facilitate trade openness by reducing the adjustment costs for workers whose interests are threatened by increased 
foreign competition. Dreher and Gaston (2005) argue that a more sophisticated index of globalization suggests that 
globalization has had an effect on unionization. 
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While there are differences in the technological level, the 21 countries generally have similar levels of 
access to and use of an important range of business technologies. Figure 5, for example, shows each 
country’s score (on a scale from zero to six) on the World Economic Forum’s Networked Readiness 
Index (NRI) in 2009-10. The United States ranked fourth (after Sweden, Denmark, and 
Switzerland),13 with all but Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain clustered fairly closer together. The 
figure also graphs the WEF technology index against union coverage and finds no significant 
relationship across our sample. 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Union Coverage and WEF Index of Network Readiness, 21 Rich Nations 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of ICTWSS and WEF data (2009-2010). 
 
Given that all of these countries were at approximately the same level of economic development and 
all were subjected to the same kinds of pressures from globalization and technological progress, the 
different trends apparent across the rich economies strongly suggest that more globalization and 
better technology do not inexorably lead to lower unionization rates.  
 
 
Unionization and National Politics 
 
We argue, instead, that national politics, not globalization or technology, are the most important 
determinants of unionization trends over time. We draw on the extensive literature, initiated by 
Gosta Esping-Andersen14, on the “worlds of welfare capitalism” in rich countries. This research has 
typically organized the better-off OECD economies into three or four categories by broad features 
of their political systems and then explored the impact of these different systems on social and 
economic outcomes. The terminology and exact composition of the countries varies across the 
                                                 
13 In the full WEF list, the United States also placed behind Singapore, which is not included in our sample. 
14 Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990). 
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hundreds of published papers,15 but three frequently recurring groupings are, loosely: “social 
democratic”; “Christian democratic”; and “liberal market.” The work of Hall and Soskice16 on 
“varieties of capitalism” has also been influential, but they divide the same set of countries into only 
two categories “coordinated market economies” and “liberal market economies.” 
 
We follow, with one minor modification and a slight change of terminology, the political typology 
used in Navarro, Schmitt, and Astudillo,17 which assigns 21 OECD countries to one of four broad 
political regimes: “social democratic” (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden); “continental 
market” (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland); “liberal 
market,” by the 19th century and contemporary European usage of the term liberal (Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States); and “ex-dictatorships” 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain).18  
 
The four traditions are based on an analysis of the political parties in power in these countries during 
the years 1946 through 1980.19 The minor modification of the Navarro et al framework is that here 
we have moved Austria from the “social democratic” to the “continental market” group. While 
Austria had social democratic governments during much of the initial postwar period (1946-1980), 
the Austrian social democrats often ruled in coalition with Christian democrats. Our findings below 
are not sensitive to where we place Austria, nor to other common variations in country 
classification.  
 
Figures 6 through 9 present the same unionization trends as in Figure 3, but now grouping the rich 
countries by their political system. This simple exercise reveals strong similarities in unionization 
trends within – and strong differences across – political groupings. In reviewing these trends by 
country type, we focus on the period from 1980, when globalization and technology accelerated in 
most accounts. 
 
The social democratic countries (Figure 6) have consistently high levels of union coverage (dashed 
line) and union membership (solid line). Coverage rates were flat or even rising in all four countries. 
Membership rates, which are nearly as high as coverage rates, changed little or fell slightly. 
 
The continental market economies (Figure 7), except arguably Switzerland, have high levels of 
union coverage. Since 1980, these coverage rates remained roughly flat or even increased in six of 
the seven countries. The exception is Germany, where coverage fell 25 percentage points between 
1980 and the late 2000s. By contrast, union membership rates fell in all seven countries (though the 
decline was small in Belgium). All the continental market economies show a large gap between 
coverage and membership rates. The collective-bargaining systems in these countries extend 
negotiated wages and employment conditions to many non-union workers. 
 
The liberal market economies (Figure 8) generally have relatively low unionization rates and these 
rates have declined in every one of these countries. In the late 2000s, relative to the rest of the liberal 
                                                 
15 See Scruggs and Allan (2006) and Huber and Stephens (2005). 
16 Hall and Soskice (2001). 
17   Navarro, Schmitt, and Astudillo (2004). 
18 We have also changed our category labels slightly. Navarro, Schmitt, and Astudillo (2004) use “social democratic,” 
“Christian/conservative,” “liberal,” and “ex-dictatorships.” 
19 See Huber and Stephens (2001a, 2001b) and Navarro, Schmitt, and Astudillo (2004) for further discussion and a 
description of the criteria used for assigning countries to categories. 
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market economies, coverage rates were higher in Australia and Ireland and membership rates were 
higher in Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Between 1980 and 2007, union coverage and 
membership rates fell only about five percentage points in Canada. In the rest of these countries, 
however, unionization rates fell substantially. In all of the liberal market economies except Australia, 
there is little difference between coverage and membership rates because the collective-bargaining 
systems generally do not extend contract terms to non-union workers. 
 
Results are less clear cut for the ex-dictatorships of Greece, Portugal, and Spain (Figure 9). Up until 
the mid-1970s, when all three were ruled by authoritarian right-wing governments, union 
membership was either mandatory (in Portugal, in state-controlled unions) or essentially illegal 
(Spain and Greece).20 As a result, through about 1980, the ICTWSS coverage and membership data 
show either erratic patterns (Portugal and Spain) or contain no data (Greece). Focusing on the 
period from 1980 to the end of the 2000s, union coverage rates rose in Spain, and declined slightly 
in Greece and substantially in Portugal. Membership rates, meanwhile, fell in all three countries 
(sharply in Portugal and only slightly in Spain). 
 
 
FIGURE 6 
Union Coverage and Union Membership, Social Democratic Economies, 1960-2010 
 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of unions in Portugal and Spain during the transition to democracy, see Teixeira (2001); for Greece, 
see Ioannou (1999) and Robolis (2008). 
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FIGURE 7 
Union Coverage and Union Membership, Continental Market Economies, 1960-2010 
 
 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
 
FIGURE 8 
Union Coverage and Union Membership, Liberal Market Economies, 1960-2010 
 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
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FIGURE 9 
Union Coverage and Union Membership, Ex-dictatorships, 1960-2010 
 
 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
 
 
Figure 10 summarizes the changes in union coverage between 1980 and the late 2000s. The 21 
countries in the sample are organized by the four political categories, from top to bottom: social 
democratic, continental market, liberal market, and ex-dictatorships. While there is some variation 
within each political grouping, the change in coverage rates is strongly influenced by national 
political tradition. Between 1980 and 2007, the social democratic countries saw coverage rates 
increase, on average, five percentage points. Over the same period, the continental market 
economies experienced a small decline in coverage that averaged four percentage points. Meanwhile, 
coverage rates fell in all of the liberal market economies, with an  average decline of 26 percentage 
points (20 percentage points at the median). In the ex-dictatorships, the average change over the 
period in coverage was close to zero. 
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FIGURE 10 
Change in Union Coverage, 1980-2007 
 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
 
 
Corresponding data for union membership rates appear in Figure 11. The change in membership 
rates also clusters by political category. Membership rates fell across all four types, but the average 
changes differ substantially across the groups. On average, membership rates declined 5 percentage 
points for social democratic countries; 14 percentage points for continental market economies; 23 
percentage points for liberal market economies; and 18 percentage points for ex-dictatorships. 
 
CEPR Politics Matter: Changes in Unionization Rates in Rich Countries, 1960-2010   15 
 
 
FIGURE 11 
Change in Union Membership, 1980-2007 
 
Source: 1960-2010 ICTWSS data from Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS). 
 
 
Taken together, the data on changes in union coverage and membership in Figures 10 and 11 
suggest that national political traditions (as embodied in labor law, industrial relations practices, 
political party structures, and other factors) are a major determinant of trends in unionization over 
the last three decades.21 These findings are robust to the most common reclassifications of political 
traditions.22 
                                                 
21 Our findings are consistent with the more detailed analysis of union membership trends by Sano and Williamson 
(2008), who conclude “concerns over globalization are not as crucial to union densities as many analysts have 
suggested” (p. 496). 
22 For example, dividing the sample according to Hall and Soskice’s (2001) classifications, between 1980 and 2007, 
union coverage fell an average of 29 percentage points in their “liberal market” countries and an average of only 2 
percentage points in their “coordinated market” economies. 
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Conclusion  
 
National political traditions established in the period 1946 through 1980 have a strong capacity to 
predict changes in unionization rates from 1980 to the present. Of course, our analysis cannot 
establish causality, but the data are consistent with the view that national politics are a major 
determinant of national unionization rates and changes in those rates in recent decades. At the same 
time, the data contradict the view that a decline in unionization rates is an inevitable implication of 
“globalization” or technological change.  
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